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IN THE SUPRElVIE COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ARTHUR P. DANSAK and
ROBERTS. LYON,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
Case No.
9355

vs.
LOUIS C. DELUKE,

Defendcml and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs instituted this suit to recover the principal sum
and interest due on several promissory notes. Defendant conceded nonpayment of the notes by him but contended that
they had been discharged by a purported agreement entered
into between the plaintiffs and a third person. The case was
tried by the court sitting without a jury on May 11 and June
13 and 14, 1960. Judgment was entered in favor of the
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plaintiffs and the court denied defendant's motion for a new
trial. This appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
As a preface to his Statement of Facts, defendant at
page 1 of his brief advises the Court that the controlling
question in this case is "what consideration did plaintiffs,
Dansak and Lyon, give for Lucy Deluke Jones' promise ... to
assign the [ Carisa] Lease . . . ?" This was not the question
before the trial court and this is not the issue before this
Court on appeal. The issue is whether or not the plaintiffs
entered into a contract, for the cancellation of their notes,
and, if so, whether the contract was consummated and amounted
to a discharge of the notes. Defendant had the burden of
proving the contract and a discharge of the notes. The
trial court found from the evidence that plaintiffs did not
agree to cancel their notes and that any agreement made with
respect to the corporation was not consummated but was frustrated. There is ample evidence to support these ·findings.
The plaintiffs each loaned money to the defendant and
took promissory notes evidencing the indebtedness. The notes
have never been paid. Defendant's defense is based upon an
alleged agreement which he claims arose out of the formation
of a corporation in Phoenix, Arizona.
The loan transactions on which the notes are based
are entirely unrelated to the corporate affair in Phoenix.
The defendant was not a party to the latter transaction. It
is undisputed that the plaintiffs themselves received nothing
in cash, stock or property of any kind from the Phoenix
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deal. Defendant's theory, however, appears to be that the
plaintiffs orally agreed with one Lucy Deluke Jones (herein
called Lucy) to cancel their notes in exchange for the assignment of a lease. The testimony of plaintiffs on the subject is
clear. Dansak testified:
(R. 211)

"Q. Have you ever discussed the matter of distribution
or cancellation of your notes with Lucy Jones or
Ed Jones?

A. No.
Q. At any time?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever authorized anyone to act on your
behalf in negotiatmg the cancellation or dis-.
charge of these notes?

A. No."

(R. 213, 214)
"Q. Did you ever at any time have a discussion with
Ed Jones regarding the cancellation of these notes?
A. I have never discussed dissolving these notes at any
time with any person.''
Lyon testified:

(R. 120)
"Q. Have you ever had any conversation with either
Lucy Jones or Ed Jones regarding the cancellation
of these notes ?
A. No.
Q. Has any conversation ever been had in your presence with Lucy Jones, Ed Jones, or either of them,
regarding cancellation of these notes?
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A. No.

Q. Have you ever authorized anyone on your behalf,
any of these incorporators, to speak for you in
regard to disposition of these notes.

A. No."
Under questioning by the court Lyon testified as follows:

(R. 220)
"Q. Counsel asked you whether or not you ever
authorized anyone to speak for you in canceling
the obligations of Mr. Deluke on these notes.
Were you aware anyone was presuming to speak
for you, with or without authority, or appeared
to be speaking for you and against others in
reference to the claim against Louis C. Deluke?
A. I was not, and this was not the intent of the organizers of the Sphinx Head Mining Company."
There was no direct evidence whatever that the plaintiffs
had agreed with Lucy Deluke to cancel their notes.
The main issue reserved for trial by the pretrial order
was "what was the agreement between Lucy Deluke, [and]
the plaintiffs ... (R. 12) ." Although the defendant in referring to the plaintiffs in his brief uses such words as "memory
lapses," "larcenous," "fleecing," "greed," ··untrustworthy" and
"selfish plan," the defendant does not tell us when, where and
between whom the alleged contract was made nor what the
terms of the contract were nor when, if at all, the alleged
contract was consummated.
Defendant in his brief says that" objectively a contract
was made at least by the March 6 meeting and completely
complied with by Lucy and ratified by the subsequent actions

4
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of the incorporators" (page 16), and later in his brief says
"it is the defendant's position that the March 6, 1957, meeting
resulted in an accord and satisfaction wherein the Phoenix
group traded their claims against the defendant in return for
a promised share in the corporation.'' Still later in his brief
defendant says "Lucy promised to convey the Carisa Lease in
trust for a future corporation in return for a promise on the
part of the Phoenix group to discharge and release the obligations which they claimed against Lucy's uncle, Louis C. Deluke." These three quotes taken from defendant's brief
demonstrate the confusion of the defendant himself in the
assertion that the notes were discharged.
Although the date of the contract is not fixed, defendant
has stated under oath that the agreement upon which he
relies is an oral contract entered into in Phoenix, Arizona,
in l\1arch, 1957 (Answer to Interrogatory No. 6, R. 18). The
plaintiffs did not meet at any time with Lucy Deluke during
the months of January or February, 1957 (R. 119, 120, 211).
Yet, on February 16 (prior to the purported contract) Lucy
assigned the Carisa Lease to herself and Dr. Rogers as trustees
(R. 182). This instrument was one of defendant's exhibits
and it recites that a corporation would be formed and that
stock would be issued
"in such amounts as shaH hereafter be determined
by the first constituted Board of Directors of the pro·
posed corporation, which shall include the undersigned
(Lucy] and Dr. William J. Rogers of Phoenix, Arizona, and such others as they shall jointly agree on .
. . . " (Ex. D-5).
In view of the fact that defendant does not claim any contract
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until March, 195 7, and in view of the fact that there was no
discussion regarding stock division until March, it is apparent
that the assignment in trust could not have been made in
reliance on any contract or agreement as to stock division. As
to stock division this was to be decided "by the first constituted
Board of Directors of the corporation (Ex. D-5) ."
On March 5 the incorporators met, selected officers and
directors and decided upon a name for the proposed corporation. The following day, on March 6, the incorporators discussed
a division of the capital stock of the corporation and decided
upon the proposed capital structure and a division of the
capital stock.
The articles of incorporation were signed on March 21
and filed on March 28. On April 16, the first constituted
Board of Directors met in the first official meeting of the new
corporation. At this meeting the trustees, Lucy Deluke and Dr.
Rogers executed an assignment of the Carisa Lease to the
corporation. Suggestions were made by counsel of the corporation with respect to the watering effect which their original
proposed division of stock would result in. Since the business of
the meeting of the 16th was not concluded, it was continued
the following day on April 17. On the 17th the Board of
Directors resumed the discussion on division of the capital
stock and it was suggested that each incorporator receive a
proportionately smaller amount than arrived at in the March 6
meeting. The first meeting of the Board of Directors of the
corporation blew up at this point when Lucy Deluke and her
husband, Ed Jones, got up and walked out of the meeting.
There were several attempts made to resolve the rift
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which had occurred as a result of the April 17 discussions about
stock division. Lucy and her hucband, Ed, and the other incorporators never did agree between themselves as to the shares
to be issued to each of the incorportaors. The dispute was
never settled and no capital stock of the corporation was ever
issued to any stockholder. The corporation conducted no actual
corporate business and was formally dissolved the following
spnng.
Lucy was advised that it would be impossible to go ahead
with the corporate transaction unless she could agree with
the other incorporators as to the amount of capital stock to be
issued (Ex. P-13). There was no agreement made. When Lucy
left the April 17 meeting, she considered the deal as having
been frustrated, and she again considered herself as owner of
the Carisa Lease (R. 203). Since that time she has paid the
lease payments, done the assessment work and considered herself in all respects as the owner of the said lease. The corporation has takn the same position. It did not even show the lease
on its balance sheet at the time of dissolution. Lucy claims to
be the owner of the lease and apparently no one disputes this
fact. But she also contends that as a result of the transactions
just described she accomplished the cancellation of $80,000 in
indebtedness on the part of Louis Deluke, including the
plaintiffs' claims against Deluke.
Lucy claims that she intended to obtain a cancellation
of Louis Deluke' s notes. If this was her intention, there is no
evidence that she ever made this fact known to the plaintiffs,
Dansak and Lyon. The matter of the cancellation or discharge
of their notes was never discussed with them and their testimony that they did not intend to release Deluke is unimpeached.
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In order to draw the papers necessary to organize a
corporation, it was necessary to have the services of legal
counsel. The evidence discloses that Dr. Rogers, one of the
mcorporators, employed Charles Stanecker to do the legal work
necessary in forming a corporation. He prepared the papers and
advised as to the legal requirements of organizing an Arizona
corporation. If he represented any of the incorporators as
distinguished from the corporation, he represented all of them,
including Lucy and her husband, Ed. Stanecker was not authorized directly or by implication to negotiate for the discharge of
the plaintiffs' claims against Deluke or to in any way deal with
said claims. Stanecker never represented the plaintiffs as
individuals (R. 128) and was never employed by them to deal
with their personal claims against Deluke.
Instead of bringing Stanecker before the court, the defendant sought to offer testimony as to purported statements
made by him in February, 1957, which defendant claims would
have a bearing on the purported contract between Lucy and
the plaintiffs This testimony was properly excluded.
Lucy Deluke brought her own counsel to Arizona, and
he advised her concerning the transaction. Stanecker never
made any request for the notes. Lucy Deluke' s counsel never
made any request for the notes and Lucy herself never requested
delivery of the notes from the plaintiffs. Although she now
claims that the notes were discharged, she did not make such
claim until this suit was instituted. Notwithstanding the fact
that there were at least two attorneys involved in the transaction
and that minutes were taken of all of the meetings, there is
not a single written document nor is there any reference in
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the minutes of the meetings evidencing any intended cancellation of the Louis Deluke obligations.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD FAILED TO PROVE A
DISCHARGE OF THE NOTES.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING
KENNON'S T E S T I M 0 NY AS TO EXTRAJUDICIAL
STATEMENTS OF STANECKER.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DIRECTORS FAILED TO AGREE UPON A DIVISION OF STOCK
AND THAT THE CORPORATE VENTURE WAS FRUSTRATED IS SUPPORTED BY AMPLE EVIDENCE.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER EVIDENCE.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD FAILED TO PROVE A
DISCHARGE OF THE NOTES.
The defendant contends in effect that the court was
required to find as a matter of law that the plaintiffs agreed
with Lucy Deluke to cancel their notes and that the effect of
the agreement was to discharge the defendant's obligation
thereon.
As already pointed out, defendant has not furnished the
Court with any evidence nor is there any clear statement in
defendant's brief which indicates what the actual substance of
the alleged contract was. The plaintiffs categorically deny
that they discussed the cancellation of their notes with anyone
at any time and specifically state that they made no agreement
whatever with Lucy Deluke, by the terms of which they were to
cancel or surrender their notes. Although there were numerous
written documents, including written minutes of all of the
meetings of the incorporators, there was nothing whatever in
any of the written instruments to indicate that the plaintiffs had
agreed to cancel their notes. Lucy Deluke claims that she
brought her attorney from Texas to Phoenix to see that the
transaction was cinched down and yet there is nothing whatever
in writing to corroborate her claim that the notes were to be
cancelled. Lucy herself did not offer one sentence of testimony
to the effect that either Dansak or Lyon agreed with her to
discharge the notes. Further, Lucy admits that she never did
ask for surrender of the notes. She didn't ask for the notes
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after the assignment in trust; she didn't request delivery of
the notes after the assignment to the corporation, and she
didn't make any claim that the notes were discharged until
this suit was instituted.
In the face of these facts Deluke now contends that the
evidence before the trial court required a finding as a matte1'
of law that the plaintiffs had agreed to cancel their notes and
that the agreement was consummated. We submit that this
contention demonstrates the desperate straits of the defendant
in finding some ground for reversal of the trial court's judgment.
Defendant suggests in his brief that "objectively a contract
was made, at least by the March 6 meeting (Pg. 16) ."
Plaintiffs' testimony is that they had not ever met with Lucy
or her representatives until March 5. There was no discussion
in the meeting of the 5th or the 6th (or at any other time)
pertaining to the notes. What acts of the plaintiffs does the
defendant claim required the court to find as a matter of law
that "objectively" a contract was formed? There is not enough
substance in this argument to merit answer.
As another point in his brief defendant says "the March
6 meeting resulted in an accord and satisfaction (Pg. 16) ."
\Vhat was there about this meeting that resulted in the loss of
the plaintiffs' claims against Deluke? The assignment in trust
had been made several days before on February 16. At that
time the assignment which Lucy had signed indicated that the
division of stock was to be decided upon by the Board of
Directors of a corporation that had not even been organized on
March 6. Lucy at the March 6 meeting made no promise and
relinquished nothing. There was no promise or agreement
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made on the part of the plaintiffs. Nothing was said about the
notes. The "accord and satisfaction" arising out of the meeting
of March 6 is a mere figment of the imagination of defendant's
counsel.
Finally, defendant contends that "objectively a contract
was formed whereby Lucy promised to convey the Carisa Lease
in trust for a future corporation ... (Pg. 17)" and that it
is "wholly immaterial" what the plaintiffs "subjectively felt
or intended". We are at a loss to know what counsel means
by an "objective" contract. What evidence is relied upon to
show that Dansak and Lyon relinquished their rights against
Louis Deluke? It would appear that counsel now contends
there was an "objective contract" prior to the assignment in
trust on February 16. This is inconsistent with his claim
prior to trial that "the agreement was an oral one and was
entered into in Phoenix, Arizona, in March, 195 7 (Answer
to Interrogatory No. 6, R. 18). Neither of the plaintiffs had
anything to do with Lucy Deluke prior to March 5 (R. 119,
120, 211). There was simply no contract, subjective or
objective.
We are not told by defendant why the Court was required
as a matter of law to disregard the only direct testimony
on the issue which was given by the plaintiffs when they
categorically denied any agreement or authorization for such
agreement. A fair and impartial reading of the transcript of
the evidence will disclose not only that the judgment of the
court is supported by ample evidence but that as a matter of
law no other conclusion could have been reached for there was
simply no evidence whatever of the character necessary to
prove a contract.

12
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The undisputed evidence discloses that Lucy agreed to
a stock division by the Board of Directors. She refused to
be bound by their ultimate decision, however, and walked out
on the transaction, brushing aside efforts to settle the dispute.
She knew the corporate transactions could not go without her
consent; she had her lease, and now says that she also figures
that $80,000.00 in obligations were cancelled by her actions,
at no expense to herself. This is the practical side of the
defendant's argument.
But even had there been evidence compelling a conclusion
that plaintiffs agreed to cancel their notes, the judgment
was nevertheless correct. The entire corporate transaction
was frustrated when Lucy repudiated the proposed division
of stock on April 17. The plaintiffs received no stock or
other benefits which they might have otherwise obtained out
of the transaction. The corporation, as such, never conducted
business, was not qualified in Utah, and was dissolved before
having any stockholders. The entire object of the undertaking
was frustrated as a consequence of Lucy's refusal to abide
by the decision of the Board of Directors. Counsel in his brief
suggests that the corporation could have proceeded without
Lucy's consent. This argument ignores the fact that Lucy
was unwilling to accept anything less than a half million
shares and that all that could have resulted from the April 17
meeting had the remaining directors insisted upon going
ahead was a lawsuit over the corporation and the Carisa
Lease. Even had defendant proved a contract, the very purpose
and object of the same was frustrated, and defendant therefore cannot rely upon the same as a defense. Restatement
of Contracts, Volume 1, § 288; 12 Am. Jur. 960.

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING
KENNON'S TESTIMONY AS TO EXTRA JUDICIAL
STATEMENTS OF STANECKER.
Defendant called one Troy Kennon to testify as to an
alleged conference had out of the presence of the plaintiffs
in February, 1957. This testimony was offered to show certain
alleged statements of Charles Stanecker, an attorney, who
was employed to prepare the corporate papers. Kennon's
testimony was offered by the following questions and answers:

(R. 133)
"Q. Dd you talk to Mr. Stanecker with respect to the
request Mr. Deluke had made?
A. Yes, but prior to the time I discussed this matter
with Mr. Stanecker, I asked him whether or not
he had the authority to represent all the parties
who held notes and other obligations of Louis
Deluke.

Q. What did Mr. Stanecker say?
A. He advised me . . .
MR. MACFARLANE: I am going to object to
what Mr. Stanecker said. If they are attempting
to prove agency, they can't do it by the claimed
agent.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained."
The plaintiff objected to the testimony of Kennon on the
grounds that it was hearsay (R. 134).
Defendant's counsel stated that he offered Kennon's
testimony to show that "Mr. Stanecker had a concept of what
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the ideas of these incorporators were (R. 134) ." When the
evidence was refused, defendant's counsel made a proffer of
Kennon's testimony stating that Kennon would testify that
he had "satisfied himself" that the men in the corporation
"were transferring all of the legal obligations of Mr. Louis
Deluke for Lucy Deluke signing her property to the corporation" (R. 137}.
What Stanecker' s concept of the incorporators' ideas were
is not material or relevant. At most it would be a conclusion
on his part. Likewise, Kennon's conclusion was not material to
any issue before the court.
The law is well settled that Stanecker' s statement as to
whether or not he was authorized by the plaintiffs as their
agent was hearsay and inadmissible. Agency cannot be proved
by declarations of the claimed agent. Restatement of Agency,
§ 285; 3 C.J.S. 276; State vs. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 390-391,
120 P.2d 285, 298, 299.
There was no evidence whatever that the plaintiffs had
authorized Stanecker to deal with their claims against Louis
Deluke. Staneckers' only connection with the plaintiffs was
that he was employed by one of the other incorporators to
do legal work in the organization of the corporation. The
very issue in this lawsuit was whether or not the plaintiffs
as a part of the corporate transaction agreed to cancel or
discharge their notes. Plaintiffs offered no independent evidence
whatever to the effect that Dansak and Lyon had authorized
Stanecker to speak for them in the settlement of their claims
against Deluke. The only evidence with respect to Stanecker' s
authority came from the plaintiffs themselves, who emphatically
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denied that Stanecker was so authorized and testified that the
corporate transaction did not involve the proposed cancellation
or discharge of the Deluke notes (R. 120, 128, 211, 213, 214).
In determining whether or not to admit the alleged
extrajudicial statements of Stanecker the court made a determination as to the sufficiency of the preliminary facts bearing
upon the claimed agency. The determination that Stanecker
was not authorized by Dansak and Lyon to speak in the cancellation of their notes was not only supported, but compelled by
the evidence before the court. But even assuming that the evidence might have been properly received, the applicable rule
seems to be that where admissibility turns upon a determination
of preliminary facts, the admission or exclusion of the proffered
evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. This
rule is affirmed in the case of Jameson vs. First Savings Bank
& Trust Company, 40 N.M. 133, 55 P.2d 743, cited by defendand, wherein the court said:
"The great weight of modern authority, moreover,
inclines toward leaving the question of admissibility
of this class of evidence to the discretion of the trial
court."
The New Mexico Supreme Court in the Jameson case quoted
with approval from Roach vs. Great Northern R. Co., 133
Minn. 257, 158 N.W. 232, wherein the court said:
"It may accurately enough be said that there is no
specific rule of precise application. In each case the
application must depend upon the particular facts
. . . In reviewing the trial court's ruling this court
defers to its determination of the preliminary facts
bearing upon the propriety of receiving the testimony.
To this extent its admissibility is within the sound
judgment of the trial court."
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Defendant cites the Restatement of Agency, Section 50,
m support of his contention that the testimony of Kennon
was admissible. This section provides:
"Unless otherwise agreed, authority to make a contract is inferred from authortiy to conduct a transaction,
if the making of such a contract is incidental to the
transaction, usually accompanies such a transaction,
or is reasonably necessary to accomplish it."
In the case at bar there is no evidence that Stanecker was
authorized "to conduct a transaction" on behalf of the plaintiffs,
and certainly it cannot be said that the discharge of the
Deluke notes was "incidental to the transaction" or "usually
accompanied such a transaction" or was "reasonably necessary
to accomplish it." None of these requirements were met
in the instant case. In determining these preliminary facts
adversely to the defendant and excluding the testimony, the
court did not abuse its discretion.
Lastly, we point out as already noted under Point I,
that even had a contract been proved, the undisputed evidence
shows that it does not constitute a defense because the entire
purpose thereof was frustrated (Finding No. 11). Thus the
exclusion of Stanecker' s testimony could not be determinative
in any event.
We respectfully submit that the trial court did not err
in excluding Kennon's testimony as to the alleged statements
of Stanecker.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DIRECTORS FAILED TO AGREE UPON A DIVISION OF STOCK
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AND THAT THE CORPORATE VENTURE WAS FRUSTRATED IS SUPPORTED BY AMPLE EVIDENCE.
By its Finding of Fact No. 11 the court found as follows
(R. 25-26):
"No. 11. The defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors
of Sphinx Head Mining Corporation agreed upon a
division of the capital stock of said corporation as to
Lucy Deluke and the purpose of any purported agreement entered into between the plaintiffs and the said
Lucy Deluke was thereby frustrated without the fault
or neglect of the plaintiffs."
Defendant contends that the inference to be drawn from this
finding is that in its absence the court "would have been
compelled to find for the defendant, or at least it would
not have felt precluded from finding for the defendant." This
is not so.
The court found by its finding No. 10 that the defendant
had failed to prove an agreement for cancellation of the
notes. Under finding No. 10 the court was compelled to enter
judgment for the plaintiffs. The facts found in finding No. 11
were not necessary to the decision unless plaintiffs had actually
proved a contract. Since there was ample evidence to support
finding No. 10, this point of defendant's brief is moot.
However, considering on the merits plaintiff's contention
with respect to finding No. 11, we submit that the finding
was supported by ample evidence. Lucy and Ed Jones parted
with the other directors when the disagreement arose in the
April 17 meeting with respect to stock division. When Lucy
left the meeting in April, she and her husband Ed, and the
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five other incorporators were diametrically opposed as to the
division of the capital stock of the corporation.
Lucy, along with the other incorporators, was told in
the April 17 meeting that the disagreement would "stop any
further action of the corporation (R. 218) ." After the meeting
Lucy was advised as follows by letter dated April 25:

(Ex. P-13)
"Until this problem with respect to the issuance of
the stock has been determined it is impossible to go
forward."
Defendant's counsel now suggest that the corporation
could have legally gone ahead without her consent even though
she was to furnish the only asset of the corporation and was to
be the majority stockholder. Any such action on the part of the
other directors would simply have resulted in a lawsuit over the
lease and the corporate stock. But it is not material what might
have been done, for the fact is that there was a disagreement
between the directors as to the stock to be issued and this
dispute was the actual cause of the failure of the corporation
to get under way.
As a result of the dispute, none of the capital stock
of the corporation was ever issued, and the Carisa lease was
never operated or developed by the corporation. Although one
of the officers wrote an unofficial letter, the corporation, itself,
conducted no business, served no useful purpose, and was dissolved in the spring of 1958. Defendant points out in his
brief that the mutual objective of the incorporators was to
promote and develop the Carisa properties. This object was
completely frustrated. The plaintiffs never acquired any
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interest in the corporation or in the Carise lease, nor did they
receive any cash or property of any kind as a result of the
transaction.
There was ample evidence to support the court's finding
No. 11.

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER EVIDENCE.
By Point IV of his brief defendant singles out five or
six rulings of the court which he claims to be erroneous.
The question calling for the witness to answer as to
what the agreement was when the trust assignment was executed
R. 97) clearly called for a conclusion. Also, defendant's own
evidence shows that the trust assignment was executed in
February and there was no discussion about stock division
until March, so there could not have been an agreement when
the assignment was executed.
The court properly excluded the testimony relating to
Lucy's alleged agreement with Dr. Rogers (R. 145). Such
testimony certainly had no materiality with respect to the
alleged agreement between Lucy and the plaintiffs. This is
especially so where the negotiations with Rogers were out of
the presence of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs had no knowledge of them.
Also, the court properly ruled out a self-serving and
hearsay letter written by Lucy (R. 152). An examination
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of this proposed exhibit shows that it contains nothing that
would be material even if the letter were otherwise admissible.
When defendants' counsel asked defendant a leading
question as to whether or not Stanecker said he was speaking
for the other incorporators, the court proper! y sustained
counsel's objection to the same (R. 156). The question clearly
called for a conclusion. By the very next question and answer
defendant's counsel asked and received the information sought
by the improper question.
Finally, the court was not in error in excluding hearsay
and conclusion statements by Ed Jones (R. 234, 235). In
all instances where the plaintiffs were present the court
admitted testimony as to what was actually said, but properly
excluded the witnesses' conclusions as to what was said.
The evidence which defendant claims should have
been received is typical of the quality of the evidence
on which the defendant's entire case was grounded. The
court did not err in its rulings on the evidence and certainly
nothing "critical" was excluded.

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
The defendant suggests that the court erred in denying
his motion for new trial. In support of this contention,
defendant argues that one of his own exhibits, Exhibit D-5,
was not genuine, suggesting that affidavits submitted after
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the trial raised ''a question as to the accuracy and possibly
the authenticity" of the said exhibit.
Defendant actually complains of one of his own exhibits
which was offered by his own counsel in support of his own
case. With this in mind, it is difficult to see how the defendant
could expect the trial court or this court to grant him a new
trial so that he could try the case again without the exihbit.
The court indicated during the course of the arguments
that even if defendant's Exhibit D- 5 were not genuine and
even had defendant produced the exhibit he claimed to be the
actual instrument, it would not be determinative since it was
a unilateral instrument (Supplemental Record 20).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion for new trial.
CONCLUSION
This suit though involving a rather simple issue has
taken three years to prosecute to judgment. We respectfully
submit that the record on appeal demonstrates that the trial
court conducted a fair and impartial trial of the issues raised
by the lawsuit and that there was no error made in its rulings
on the evidence. The evidence discloses that the defendant has
not repaid his obligtaion on the notes. Defendant failed to
prove that the notes had been otherwise discharged. The
judgment should stand.
Respectfully submitted,
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR.
for VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY
Attorneys for Respondents
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